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Abstract
This study integrates perspectives from neo-institutional economics, organization theory and information systems to 
examine why firms choose different governance structures across business process outsourcing (BPO) relationships. 
In particular, we focus on the information processing (IP) requirements that must be managed during the course of 
the BPO relationship and antecedent uncertainty in the business environment, outsourced business process, and 
BPO relationship that influence governance choice through their impact on such IP requirements. Further, we 
theorize that the influence of IP requirements on governance choice is moderated by the choice of technological 
capabilities. Survey data on 130 BPO initiatives provide empirical support for our hypotheses. Our results 
emphasize that in modern information intensive BPO relationships, hierarchical controls embedded in the 
governance structure are an important IP mechanism that helps the user firm effectively respond to IP requirements 
of the relationship and resolve incentive and cognitive conflict between the participant firms.
Keywords: Business Process Outsourcing; Uncertainty; Information Requirements; Governance
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CONFLICT RESOLUTION OR INFORMATIONAL 
RESPONSE? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE 
DETERMINANTS OF GOVERNANCE CHOICE IN BUSINESS 
PROCESS OUTSOURCING RELATIONSHIPS
Introduction
Business process outsourcing (BPO) refers to the transfer of the management of one or more information intensive
business process to an external provider, who, in turn, owns and administers the selected process(es) based on 
specific performance criteria. BPO is the fastest growing segment of the outsourcing market1, and represents the 
latter’s maturity from a cost saving tool for transaction intensive business processes to a flexible and powerful 
strategy for business transformation (Linder 2004). This increased diversity of outsourcing objectives has been 
accompanied by an allied increase in the diversity of relational structures used to realize these objectives, 
emphasizing the multitude of complex choices that user firms face in structuring the BPO relationship (Gottfredson 
et al. 2005; Linder 2004). This study develops a model of governance choice that helps user firms identify and 
manage the complexity in organization of BPO arrangements. It examines some of the factors, both exogenous and 
endogenous to the BPO initiative that impact the formal structure used to govern it.
Consistent with prior research (Gulati and Singh 1998; Leiblein et al. 2002; Williamson 1991), we define the 
governance structure as the formal contract used by participant firms to formalize the BPO relationship. The neo-
institutional economics literature primarily2 distinguishes among formal contracts in terms of the level of 
hierarchical control that they embody. Given that the flow of control follows the structure of the hierarchy, 
integrative outsourcing structures such as joint ventures or minority equity alliances, comprising the hierarchical end 
of the spectrum, are marked by relatively greater levels of control than long-term and arms length contracts.
The study of outsourcing governance choices has largely been dominated by transaction cost economics (TCE) 
(Williamson 1975, 1991) which views hierarchical control as a mechanism to address exchange hazards in the 
outsourcing relationship and yield collectively beneficial outcomes. The exchange hazards stem from uncertainty 
perceived by the user firm about its relationship with the provider, and usually arise in situations where there are 
large amounts of surplus to be divided ex post, and in which it is costly to write a complete contingent contract ex 
ante that specifies a clear division of this surplus or in which contractual monitoring and enforcement pose major 
challenges. In such case, the adoption of few hierarchical controls engenders risks of moral hazard and hold-up. 
Hierarchical governance structures provide an integrative framework for work and decision making that helps 
adjudicate differences, overcome individual conflicts of interest, and facilitate effective ex post adaptation. 
Conversely, the potential effects of adopting a more hierarchical governance structure when uncertainty and allied 
exchange hazards are low include loss of flexibility and decision making speed. Thus, TCE posits that the level of 
hierarchical control in the governance structure must be discriminatingly aligned with the exchange hazards in the 
BPO relationship (Leiblein et al. 2002; Pisano 1990)3. The greater the exchange hazards, the more integrated must 
be the exchange or the more hierarchical must be the nature of the governing contract.
1 According to IDC, the worldwide BPO market is expected to grow from $405 billion in 2003 to $682.5 billion in 2008. By 2008, the 
use of external technology and business process services is likely to move from a 2005 average of 12% of the corporation’s total 
costs to 20% of total costs. Forecast growth rates for BPO are 10-15% per annum (in contrast to 7.1% for technology infrastructure 
and application outsourcing).
2 While transaction cost economics focuses on constraints to ex post adaptation and distinguishes among contracts in terms of 
hierarchical control, the property rights literature focuses on constraints to ex ante investments and distinguishes among contracts in 
terms of residual rights of control that provide incentives for such investments. However, in this study, we focus on constraints to ex 
post adaptation and adopt the transaction cost conceptualization of formal contractual structures.
3 This logic was originally examined in the case of the make-buy-ally decision or rather, the decision to outsource. However, it has 
since been extended to study the choice of governance structure once firms decide to outsource or form an alliance (for example, 
Gulati and Singh 1998).
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This study develops the argument that the above TCE framework for representing and explaining governance choice 
must be extended to recognize significant changes in businesses that have occurred over the past decade. Rapid 
advances in communication and technology have given rise to highly information intensive firms, defined by 
frequent turnover in the information embodied in products and processes, and acquired by customers and 
competitors. Consequently, the ability to communicate and process new information and ultimately translate this 
information into decisions has emerged as an important source of firm competitiveness (Glazer 1999; Mendelson 
and Pillai 1998). In turn, the outsourcing of information intensive business processes is increasingly motivated by 
the need to enhance the information processing (IP) bandwidth of the user firm rather than by a sole reduction in 
transaction costs. The ensuing reduction in information overload allows the firm to focus limited information 
capacity on distinctive competences (Hult et al 2004) and enhance firm competitiveness. This viewpoint is reflected 
in emergent research (Siggelkow and Levinthal 2003; Sinha and Van de Ven 2005), which emphasizes that 
outsourcing forms might be best viewed as complex work systems in which the user firm is a niche node4 as 
opposed to a nexus of contracts.
This study finds that the shift in outsourcing motivation impacts the traditional transaction cost model of governance 
choice in important ways. First, it shifts attention on the basis of BPO governance choice from relational uncertainty 
and allied exchange hazards to a more holistic model of IP requirements that must be managed during the course of 
the relationship. Few empirical studies have analyzed IP requirements as a basis for the design of hierarchical 
controls in outsourcing governance structures. This study addresses this issue to introduce IP requirements as an 
important influencer of governance choice in modern outsourcing relationships. 
Further, we integrate theories of IP (Galbraith 1973) with TCE to posit that the IP requirements of the BPO 
relationship stem from the user firm’s informational response to uncertainty, both endogenous and exogenous to the 
outsourced task environment. In particular, the IP requirements of the BPO relationship are influenced by 
uncertainty in: the business environment, relationship with the service provider, and outsourced business process. 
The simultaneous effect of these variables has received scant attention in prior empirical research on adaptation in 
vertical relationships. Economic theories of organization emphasize cooperation conflicts from relational uncertainty 
while organizational theories argue that organizational design must be responsive to environmental and task 
uncertainty. Further, organizational theories have largely focused on intra-organizational coordination although 
responsiveness to task and environmental uncertainty is critical for effective inter-organizational adaptation.
Finally, the above theoretical arguments point to the mediating effect of IP requirements of the BPO relationship on 
governance structure. Prior research in TCE assumes a direct relation between relational uncertainty and governance 
choice. The mediating effect of IP requirements suggests that compared to cooperative mechanisms that resolve 
incentive conflict, hierarchical controls in governance structures might well be superior IP mechanisms that facilitate 
informational response to changes in the BPO task environment. The strength of the relationships between the 
explanatory dimensions of uncertainty, IP requirements, and governance choice is examined in light of the possible 
moderating effect of technological capabilities of the BPO relationship. 
The empirical testing of our hypotheses uses survey data on 130 active BPO relationships. In addition to its 
theoretical contribution to the literature on governance of outsourcing relationships, the study also addresses the 
concern that there is little empirical research that incorporates the distinctive nature and form of BPO. Rouse and 
Corbitt (2006) draw attention to the paucity of empirical research on BPO - they find that during the period 1980 to 
June 2005, only 11 scholarly or peer reviewed articles reported empirical research on BPO. They lament that “the 
absence of independent empirical research means that decision makers choosing whether to outsource a business 
process have to proceed on faith” (Rouse and Corbitt 2006). Our study, in explaining the factors that underlie user 
firms’ choices from the multitude of BPO relational structures available to formalize the relationship, yields insights 
into the unique nature and form of BPO relationships. 
4 This view of the user firm is best represented by the business models of a new class of “function-based companies” that 
extensively leverage BPO to concentrate scale and skill on a single function. These include UPS in logistics management, Solectron 
in contract manufacturing and Hewitt Associates in human resources management (Gottfredson et al. 2005). This view is also 
manifest in the transition of BPO to a flexible and powerful strategy used to achieve diverse strategic objectives ranging from 
innovation to speed-to-market to organizational change.
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Theory and Hypotheses
IP Requirements as a Governing Principle
The significance of IP requirements to the design of hierarchical controls has been primarily emphasized in the 
organization of activities within a firm. The IP view of the firm (Galbraith 1973) characterizes organizations as IP 
networks with limited information processing capacity (or bounded rationality) that are faced with different levels of 
uncertainty or contingencies in their business and task environments. This school of research (Child 1977; Daft and 
Lengel 1986) posits that hierarchical controls are superior information processing mechanisms that ensure effective 
communication and integration of effort between members of a firm so as to respond effectively to the presented 
contingencies. The right structural design or level of hierarchical control facilitates the right amount of information 
need to cope with uncertainty and achieve desired task performance.
This study extends the above tradition of research to the inter-organizational context and emphasizes its salience to 
the context of BPO in particular. The outsourced business process in BPO is information-intensive (Aundhe 2003; 
Aron and Singh 2003) in that the primary inputs and outputs of the outsourced process are business information 
(Glazer 1999), and the successful execution of the process requires information coordination between process 
workers. Given the relatively greater frequency of change in business information, BPO relationships may involve 
more uncertainty and ambiguity on an ongoing basis than other outsourcing projects. This, in turn, creates larger 
volumes of information that need to be processed and translated into decisions (Daft and Lengel 1986) in the BPO 
relationship. In addition to the information exogenous to the outsourced task environment, information endogenous 
to the relationship between the user firm and the service provider must also be managed during the course of the 
BPO relationship. This primarily comprises information exchanged to overcome cognitive limitations and develop a 
shared understanding of outsourced tasks and interdependencies required for process management and execution. 
Diverse views of task concepts such as quality and performance standards need to be resolved for effective task 
execution. In an organization, culture and affiliation enable members to develop shared meanings (Gioia and 
Thomas 1996) required for efficient work design. However, since participant firms in the BPO relationship are 
affiliated with different organizational cultures, information fills this key role to foster shared meanings. Information 
must also be processed in the relationship to enhance organizational understanding of the partner firm’s culture, 
discern mutual adjustments in behavior, and foster mutual trust in the relationship.
The significance of providing the right amount of information to the right actor at the right time in the BPO 
relationship provides the foundation for our expectation that the governance structure of the relationship is more 
than a cooperative mechanism that addresses incentive conflict and allied exchange hazards; it is an information 
processing mechanism that provides the necessary bandwidth to additionally address IP requirements borne of 
cognitive conflict and issues in work design. Glazer’s (1993) seminal work on information intensive firms 
acknowledges this possibility that as the traditional exchange hazards pertaining to appropriability or scale diminish 
in information intensive vertical relationships, the inherent attributes of information, and not necessarily exchange 
hazards, will dictate the structure through which the process operates:
“Physical-based commodities, which are appropriable, scarce, and display decreasing returns to use, lead to concerns 
with boundaries, ownership, and allocation. Information-intensive firms, on the other hand, recognize that information, 
which is neither appropriable, nor scarce, and which displays increasing returns to use, results in the breaking down of 
boundaries and leads to accessing, sharing, and creating opportunities for use. Many of the organizational structure 
and strategic changes that have been identified as crucial to success in the changing business environment follow 
directly from an appreciation of this fundamental shift in perspective …” (pg 108)
This viewpoint is consistent with emergent research in organization and strategy that points to the complementarity 
between the contractual and relational structures in vertical relationships (Gulati et al. 2005; Poppo and Zenger 
2002). Yet, these studies do not detail the specific role of the governance structure in coordinating actions between 
participant firms. This study seeks to fill this gap in the literature through the study of governance choice in BPO as 
an information response to contingencies in the outsourced task environment.
Hierarchical Control in BPO Governance Structures
Prior research (Stinchcombe 1985; Gulati and Singh 1998) details various hierarchical controls that underlie the 
contractual structures governing vertical relationships. These include both coordination mechanisms such as 
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command structures and authority systems, operating procedures, dispute resolution procedures that align actions 
and cooperative mechanisms such as incentive and pricing systems that align incentives (Gulati and Singh 1998). A 
governance structure is hierarchical to the extent that the hierarchical elements it incorporates “replicate the control 
and coordination features associated with organizations, which are considered to be at the hierarchical end of the 
spectrum” (Gulati and Singh 1998). Thus, BPO governance structures in decreasing order of hierarchical control 
range from equity sharing structures such as joint ventures to arm’s length contracts marked by competitive bidding 
that have few hierarchical controls built into them.
We posit that that hierarchical control in the governance structure helps participant firms contend with numerous 
information states in several important ways. First, through the mutual allocation of tasks, responsibilities and 
contingent actions, these controls guide, legitimize, and reinforce information flows between participant firms. 
Operating and dispute resolution procedures are akin to rules and programs in organizations or habits in individuals 
(Galbraith 1973) that provide a memory for handling situations, thereby, rendering interactions more predictable and 
mitigating the levels of communication and decision making that contribute to the IP requirements of the BPO 
relationship. For example, in their qualitative study of contracts in the personal computer industry, Mayer and 
Argyres (2004) find that in industry contexts marked by high rates of information change, contracts function as a 
knowledge repository that guides information transfer between firms:
“…Contracting processes, our evidence suggests, might in some instances serve to help develop and codify such 
knowledge sharing routines. Moreover, it is well-established that transferring knowledge within or between 
organizations often requires at least some codification (e.g., Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995). By providing a means for 
this to occur, contracting processes could facilitate the development of such relational capital, in the form of a 
collaboration capability...” (Mayer and Argyres 2004)
Further, governance structures with greater levels of hierarchical control, say equity arrangements, reduce 
information overload in the BPO relationship through reduction in diversity of output and division of labor. The 
greater the levels of hierarchical control, the more the resources of the outsourcing structure are dedicated to the 
mandate of optimizing activities that contribute to the accomplishment of jointly defined outsourcing objectives. 
This eliminates the need to process information to determine or schedule priorities. This strategy of creating self-
contained, autonomous governance structures with high levels of hierarchical control is analogous to the IP strategy 
of creating self-contained tasks (Galbraith 1973) in organizations. Self-containment limits costly IP involving 
negotiation of resources, skills and other inputs and shifts managerial attention to outputs in the relationship. This is 
because an outsourcing structure with greater hierarchical control and autonomy has likely a dedicated management 
team, control apparatus and other strategic resources allocated at the outset. 
Finally, the level of informality in hierarchical governance structures is relatively high (March and Simon 1967), 
enabling timely sharing of information, expertise and clarification of task outputs that must ultimately be integrated 
back into the user firm’s value chain. The higher levels of informality, in addition to facilitating a shared 
understanding of changes in the information environment of the outsourced process, help to create a sense of shared 
purpose that minimizes conflict between participant firms and allied IP needs. 
Thus, different levels of hierarchical control provide differing levels of IP capabilities along a continuum ranging 
from mechanistic to organic. The above discussion emphasizes that BPO relationships with more hierarchical 
controls provide greater IP capabilities than those with fewer controls. User firms will seek the governance structure 
that is discriminatingly aligned with the IP requirements of the relationship and provides requisite amount of 
information. We posit:
Hypothesis 1: The greater the IP requirements of the BPO relationship, the more hierarchical is the governance 
structure used to organize it.
Technological Capabilities of the BPO Relationship
Research in the information systems tradition emphasizes the role of information technologies in helping firms 
address their IP requirements, and finds that technological investments and decision structures are often jointly 
determined in organizations (Brynjolffson and Mendelson 1993; Mendelson and Pillai 1998). In this section, we 
study contingent complementary and substitutional relationships between technological capabilities of the BPO 
relationship and hierarchical control to theorize how choice of the former could potentially moderate the latter.
Information Systems Strategy and Governance
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A firm’s technological resources enhance the capacity of existing channels of communication, create new channels 
of communication, and introduce new decision mechanisms (Galbraith 1973). A hierarchical governance structure 
involves complex planning and coordination mechanisms, greater number of embedded rules and routines and thus, 
greater organizational memory. Sophisticated technological capabilities are central to such complex coordination 
inherent in high levels of hierarchical control. They enable accurate and timely incorporation of changes in the 
management and execution of the process, increase the amount of information transmitted and received per unit of 
time between decision makers, are central to the timeliness and accurate interpretation of information, and the 
reduction of information overload. Given the important role of technological capabilities in the effective 
representation of information flows required for overall sound decision making, we posit:
Hypothesis 2a: The greater the technological capabilities of the BPO relationship, the greater are the positive 
impact of IP requirements on the level of hierarchical control in the governance structure, i.e. the use of 
technological capabilities complements hierarchical control in managing the IP requirements of the BPO 
relationship.  
An alternative theoretical argument is that the technological capabilities of the BPO relationship, in establishing a 
highly standardized “technical grammar” or social conventions around which firms coordinate their activities, limit 
the need for hierarchical control in the relationship to promote coordination (Argyres 1999). This is because the 
“technical dialog” facilitated by such grammar reduces the amount of information exchange between firms required 
to execute the outsourced process successfully, and allows accurate expectations about a partner firm’s response to 
mutual interdependencies. Since the legitimization and reinforcement of information flows to coordinate process 
tasks between the user firm and service provider is an explicit objective of hierarchical control, the use of 
technological capabilities to achieve this objective reduces the use of hierarchy.
Further, research in information systems and organizational economics (Gurbaxani and Whang 1991, Clemons et al. 
1993, Picot et al. 1996) emphasizes that technological investments potentially reduce transaction costs arising from 
incentive misalignments and potential opportunism. This is because the technical grammar established by 
technological investments reduces the need for specific investments that are vulnerable to appropriation by 
opportunistic firms. Sophisticated technologies also afford accurate performance measurement and monitoring of 
activities, thus reducing costly agency measurement costs. This ability of technology to address uncertainty 
perceived by the user firm about its relationship with the service provider also contributes to the reduction in IP and 
the allied need for hierarchical control.
Hypothesis 2b: The greater the technological capabilities of the BPO relationship, the lower are the positive impact 
of IP requirements on the level of hierarchical control in the governance structure, i.e. the use of technological 
capabilities substitutes hierarchical control in managing the IP requirements of the BPO relationship.  
Antecedents of IP Requirements of the BPO Relationship
Uncertainty in the Business Environment
Uncertainty in the user firm’s business environment refers to the degree of discontinuous change within the 
environment. Environmental uncertainty impacts IP requirements in many ways. Uncertainty gives rise to 
probabilistic linkages between potential path (organizational) activities and desired outcomes (Schroder et al. 1967; 
Campbell 1988). Given the presence of unbounded path possibilities, these probabilistic linkages increase the range 
of action-outcome contingencies as well as the pool of potential paths leading to desired outcomes. Systematic 
allocation of information resources are required to monitor, interpret and forecast diverse action-outcome 
contingencies, and negotiate paths that are best aligned with the objectives of the BPO relationship. Such 
contingencies include but are not limited to technological breakthroughs, shifts in consumer profile and taste, new 
modes of operational efficiency, and modifications to cost structures. Precise conceptualizations of such information 
seeking behavior include environmental scanning (Agarwal 1967), information search (Vandenbosch and Higgins 
1996), and knowledge sourcing (Gray and Meister 2004). 
Further, the information dimension of organizational products or services is time-sensitive (Glazer 1991). Therefore, 
as the rate of information change in the environment increases, there is increased pressure on the firm to use extant 
information quickly and to a wider effect. Assuming changes to organizational products and services are costless, 
environmental uncertainty gives rise to a rapid evolution of the core product/ service and a shift toward successive 
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generations of the outsourced process, thereby increasing information churn in the outsourced task environment 
(Glazer 1991). Thus, we posit:
Hypothesis 3: The higher the levels of uncertainty in the user firm’s business environment, the higher are the IP 
requirements of the BPO relationship. 
Uncertainty in the BPO Relationship
The uncertainty perceived by the user firm about its relationship with the BPO service provider is an important 
antecedent to the user firm’s IP requirements. The analysis of market transactions focuses on the consequences of 
environmental uncertainty, while the study of hierarchical organization of economic activity focuses on task 
uncertainty. However, since BPO represents a shift from the dichotomy of markets and hierarchies to strategic, 
collaborative partnership forms, we separate the effects of relational uncertainty on IP requirements from the effects 
of environmental and task or process uncertainty. Relational uncertainty engenders exchange hazards and increases 
the frictional costs of transacting. We conceptualize uncertainty in the BPO relationship through (i) relative 
bargaining power of the provider (ii) mutual trust and (iii) relational interdependence. These factors define the 
“climate” (Bensaou 1997) of the BPO relationship and thus, the uncertainty perceived by the user firm.
Bargaining Power: Bargaining power refers to “a bargainer's ability to favorably change the ‘bargaining set’, to 
win accommodations from the other party, and to influence the outcome of a negotiation” (Yan and Gray 1994). In 
this study, we focus on the alternatives available to the user firm in the context of outsourcing negotiations that is 
positively related to the service provider’s bargaining power (Fisher & Ury 1981; Gopal et al. 2003). More 
alternatives afford the user firm the opportunity to exercise its best alternative to a negotiated agreement, and 
prevent the service provider from locking in the user firm. This, in turn, reduces the provider’s bargaining power. 
The relative bargaining power of the service provider is an important antecedent to the user firm’s IP requirements. 
The user firm processes information to anticipate needs and costly contingencies in the exchange process, and 
specify them ex ante. It also expends information resources to monitor and manage probable opportunistic behavior 
against complex safeguards. The greater the relative bargaining power of the service provider, the greater is the 
information turnover in the relationship to address the uncertainty that stems from such bargaining power. Thus, we 
posit:
Hypothesis 4a: The higher the levels of bargaining power of the service provider relative to the user firm, the higher 
are the IP requirements of the BPO relationship. 
Mutual Trust: Prior research (Zaheer et al. 1998; Gulati and Singh 1998) in organization and strategy identifies 
trust as an important relational dimension that addresses both appropriation and coordination concerns in economic 
transactions. Mutual trust, in reducing information asymmetries between participant firms, mitigates problems of 
adverse selection, increases the predictability of firm behavior, and engenders greater “domain consensus” (Levine 
and White 1961). Consequently, user firms expend relatively lesser information to resolve conflicts, assess and 
monitor the service provider’s behavior, and enforce contractual provisions. 
In addition, given that mutual trust often stems from prior cooperative association between the user firm and the 
service provider (Kale et al. 2000), we note that it is associated with greater knowledge of partner firm behavior, 
processes and routines. Thus, coordination efforts and allied IP required to manage the interface between participant 
firms, including developing shared understandings and integrating actions, are relatively lower. Given the above 
arguments, we posit:
Hypothesis 4b: The higher the levels of mutual trust between the user firm and the service provider, the lower are 
the IP requirements of the BPO relationship. 
Relational Interdependence: Interdependence exists “when actions taken by one referent system affect the actions 
or outcomes of another referent system” (McCann and Ferry 1979). In the BPO relationship, interdependence 
between the user firm and the service provider introduces the need to gather, analyze and distribute pertinent process 
information among organizational actors in both firms. Such information is required to allocate task responsibilities, 
aid ongoing mutual adjustments in behavior, integrate effort to maximize process value, and facilitate timely 
communication and decisions. Further, interdependencies in collaborative outsourcing relationships require 
investments in knowledge sharing, development of trust, social ties and shared norms. Such investments to promote 
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synergistic behavior directed towards collaboratively satisfying business objectives also results in an increase in the 
IP requirements of the BPO relationship. Thus, we theorize:
Hypothesis 4c: The higher the levels of interdependence between the user firm and the service provider, the higher 
are the IP requirements of the BPO relationship. 
Uncertainty in the Outsourced Business Process
When uncertainty in the outsourced business process is high, the establishment of routines and procedures for 
process execution and management becomes difficult, and participant firms are frequently confronted with 
unfamiliar events during process execution that are not covered by internal or standard representations. The 
consequent need for acquisition of process information from diverse organizational actors on an ongoing basis to 
cope with a wide range of problems and decisions increases the amount of information processed (Daft and 
Macintosh 1981). 
In addition, BPO pervades an organization horizontally, and may require the sponsorship of several internal 
departments. Process uncertainty engenders repetitive cycles of intra-organizational information exchange towards 
integrative bargaining and reconciliation between stakeholders of BPO, deciding what tasks in the outsourced 
process to disaggregate from the value chain, and coordinating varied efforts required to transfer value from the 
outsourced task environment back to the user firm. Such enhanced information flows between sponsoring 
departments also contribute to increase in the user firm’s IP requirements. We propose two primary sources of 
uncertainty in the outsourced business process: (i) process complexity and (ii) process interdependencies.
Process Complexity: Process complexity is defined in terms of process analyzability and process variety. An 
analyzable process comprises events that are “hard, measurable and determinant” (Daft and Weick 1984). When a 
process is analyzable, outcomes are well-understood, and the process administrators follow an objective, 
computational procedure to resolve problems (Daft and Macintosh 1981). We define process variety as the 
frequency of occurrence of process events that deviate from mean values of stability and uniformity of inputs and 
outputs, thereby requiring different methodologies than is the norm for successful completion of process objectives. 
Our conceptualization of process variety is consistent with the early notion of task variability or content variety 
(Perrow 1967; Van de Ven and Delbecq 1974) as well as the more recent concept of sequential variety (Pentland 
2003). Pentland (2003) points out that while content variety focuses on variability in the inputs or outputs, 
sequential or process variety reflects diversity of work processes that an organization uses to transform inputs into 
outputs. Complex business processes are marked by low levels of analyzability and high variety.
An increase in process complexity renders it relatively difficult to establish rules, procedures and predetermined 
responses to potential process problems. In this case, given the relatively few information cues, process complexity 
causes increased number of process exceptions or deviations. Incomplete process information also implies that it is 
difficult to identify the type of information needed and assess the utility of that information to an outsourced task. 
All of these result in greater information turnover in the BPO relationship. Thus, we posit:
Hypothesis 5a: The higher the levels of complexity of the outsourced business process, the higher are the IP 
requirements of the BPO relationship. 
Process Modularity: The modularity of the outsourced process is defined by its ability to function as a coherent 
sub-task that can be analyzed, modified, and enhanced, independent of its influence on other organizational 
processes. Interdependencies of the outsourced business process require repetitive cycles of identification of process 
stakeholders, impact assessment, and bargaining and reconciliation among these stakeholders. They also limit the 
synergistic specificity or degree to which the outsourced process achieves greater functionality by its components 
being specific to one another, thereby, necessitating variety in coordination efforts required to transfer value back to 
the user firm. The increased level of intra-organizational coordination required to support process interdependencies 
increases the IP requirements of the BPO relationship. Thus, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 5b: The higher the levels of modularity of the outsourced business process, the lower are the IP 
requirements of the BPO relationship. 
Figure 1 below details the above theoretical relationships developed in this study.
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Figure 1: Research Model and Hypotheses
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The data for this study were obtained through a survey of senior executives responsible for the management of 
outsourced business processes in their respective firms. Our list of respondents came from several active 
compilations of outsourcing firms, industry association referrals, and outsourcing advisory referrals. A technique 
deployed in related research in surveying executives is “to define populations and response rates based on those who 
will pre-commit to respond” (Poppo and Zenger 2002). The normative response rates based on pre-committed 
samples are as high as 40 percent (Anderson and Narus 1990; Poppo and Zenger 2002). Six hundred pre-committed 
surveys were mailed, with follow-up letters five weeks later. We received a total of 145 valid responses of which
130 were complete in all respects. This response rate of approximately 24% was lower than expected, and was likely 
due to the lengthy and extensive nature of the questionnaire. However, it is consistent with the rate found in other 
studies (Mohr and Spekman 1994; Weiss and Anderson 1992). The final sample was representative of a range of 
outsourcing objectives for which there was sufficient variance in relational and process attributes.
No evidence of response bias was found in the data. We also checked for the presence of common-method bias 
through Harman’s single-factor test (Podsakoff & Organ, 1986). All of the variables in our study were 
simultaneously subject to an exploratory factor analysis, and the results of the unrotated factor solution were 
examined. The absence of a single factor that explained a significant amount of variance in the data suggested that 
common method bias did not likely impact survey responses.
Finally, a section of the raw data was also randomly subject to independent cross validation exercises. For a random 
sample of 25 firms, we requested the respondent firm to identify the vendor for the outsourced process for the 
purpose of a brief interview. 10 firms obliged, and we interviewed the vendors for the outsourced process to obtain 
relevant process information. The two information sets in the user firm-provider dyad were mutually consistent. 
Measures
In the case of variables that have been used in prior research, we adopted their measures after testing for reliability 
and content validity. In the case of variables that were unique to our theoretical model, we developed measures 
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based on operationalization of similar variables and discussions with different classes of BPO stakeholders. The 
measurement items were tested for content validity through discussions with outsourcing practitioners. Reliability of 
all multiple-item scales used in the study were satisfactory with Cronbach alpha values greater than 0.70.
Among the variables studied, new measures were created for IP requirements of the BPO relationship. We base the 
construct’s measurement on Keller’s (1994) measurement of IP by project groups. Two items measure the amounts 
of information communicated within the user firm and with the service provider. Two other items ask about the use 
of external agencies such as law firms, consulting firms, etc. and the different stages of the outsourcing process in 
which these agencies were used (for example, contract negotiation, vendor evaluation, etc.). 
Data Analysis
We used regression analyses of the dataset to test our hypotheses. Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates were used 
to test the hypothesized effects of various dimensions of uncertainty – environmental, process and relational - on IP 
requirements of the BPO relationship. The results of this estimation are presented as Model I in Table 3. In testing 
our model of governance choice, the use of OLS estimates is inefficient since the dependent variable, governance 
type, is ordinal. Thus, we used an ordered logistic specification to test these hypotheses: 
uXfGov +′= )( β .
The specification was estimated using maximum likelihood, and the results are shown in Table 1. 
The explanatory variables in our baseline transaction cost model of governance choice, presented as Modell II in 
Table 3, comprise sources of relational uncertainty alone. Models III – V test the mediating effect of IP requirements 
on governance choice in BPO relationships. Model III includes all three dimensions of uncertainty as explanatory 
variables, Model IV tests the impact of IP requirements on governance choice, and Model V tests the influences of 
IP requirements while controlling for the influence of all three dimensions of uncertainty. We also conducted 
principal versions of the Sobel test (MacKinnon et al. 1995; Sobel 1982) in order to assess whether the indirect 
effect of different sources of environmental, process and relational uncertainty on governance choice via IP 
requirements is significantly different from zero.
Models VI – VII test whether the technological capabilities of the BPO relationship moderate the effect of IP 
requirements on governance choice by regressing the interaction between technological capabilities and IP 
requirements on governance choice. We note that firms self-select the observed technological capabilities based on 
their own analyses of the outsourcing context that also motivates choice of hierarchical control. The failure to 
correct for unobserved firm- and transaction-level factors that simultaneously influence choice of technological 
capabilities and hierarchical control results in biased and inconsistent estimates. Thus, to account for possibly 
endogenous choices of technological capabilities, we employ a switching regression model (Heckman 1979; Lee et 
al. 1980; Smith 1980) to estimate moderation effects. 
We conceptualized two levels of technological capabilities – high and low. We define the technological capabilities
to be equal to one for cases where capabilities are high, and equal to zero for cases where capabilities are low. We 
define the threshold value for high technological capabilities as the response value of 5. We tested for and found no 
loss of information in the recoding process. We first estimate the following first stage probit model that represents 
the selection equation.
)()4_Pr()1Pr( iii XesCapabilitiTechY β ′Φ=>==
Using the predicted probabilities from the above probit model, we construct the inverse Mills ratio, λji, which is 
included as a control variable in the second-stage model of choice of hierarchical control. A point of note at this 
stage is that since this specification requires that the dependent variable be continuous, we transformed the ordinal 
hierarchical control variable into a standardized z-score. This is consistent with prior research (Freeman 1978; 
Pouliakas and Theodossiou 2007) which, in following a similar process, finds that such transformation does not 
distort regression results. Thus, the switching regression allows us to systematically discern the influence of IP 
requirements across both levels of technological capabilities. The second-stage models, which incorporate the 
correction for self-selection, provide consistent and unbiased estimates. Our analysis uses robust (Hubert-White) 
standard errors to calculate t-statistics for all regressions.
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RESULTS
Antecedents of IP Requirements of BPO Relationships
Table 1 below presents the results of analyses of IP requirements and governance choice in our sample of BPO 
relationships.
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Model R2 / 
Likelihood Ratio 
Index 
 0.35  0.13  0.17  0.16  0.21  0.22   0.23
*** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% respectively.
Model I tests the impact of various dimensions of uncertainty on the information requirements of the BPO relationship.
Model II tests the theoretical premise of TCE, Models III – V test the mediating effect of information requirements on governance structure, and models VI – VII test 
the moderating effect of technological capabilities on governance structure.
In the ordered probit models, positive coefficients indicate higher degree of hierarchical control in the governing contract as the value of the associated variable 
increases, while negative coefficients suggest the converse.
Prior research suggests that the pseudo-R-square in the ordered probit model tends to underestimate the proportion of variance explained.
Numbers below coefficients in parentheses are standard errors that are adjusted for correlations at the individual level and are robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity.
Model I in Table 1 presents the results of our analyses of determinants of IP requirements of the BPO relationship. 
Potential multicollinearity problems were investigated by examining tolerance (TOL), variance inflation factors 
(VIFs) and condition indices for the predictor variables. An analysis of these measures suggested that none of the 
coefficients were biased by multicollinearity. The coefficients of predictors in Model I indicate that in information 
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intensive outsourcing relationships, information is processed to address uncertainty in the business environment 
(Hypothesis 3), relationship with the provider (Hypotheses 4a-4c) and outsourced task (Hypotheses 5a-5b). IP 
theories, which are often applied to the study of intra-organizational adaptation, focus on uncertainty in 
organizational tasks. Our results suggest that in extending IP theories to the study of inter-organizational adaptation, 
these additional dimensions of uncertainty must be recognized.
Mediating Effect of IP Requirements on Governance Choice
Model II in Table 1 provides a baseline transaction cost specification that includes only sources of relational 
uncertainty. All three sources are significant predictors of governance choice. The results are aligned with the 
transaction cost perspective that vertical relationships characterized by higher levels of relational uncertainty will 
likely be organized under more hierarchical contracts. 
Model III introduces environmental and process uncertainty as additional antecedents of governance choice. 
Although process modularity and environmental uncertainty are not significant influencers of hierarchical control, 
process complexity emerges as a significant predictor of governance choice. The result is consistent with emergent 
research (for e.g. Gulati et al. 2005) which suggest that both appropriation concerns resulting from relational 
uncertainty and coordination concerns arising from process uncertainty are important considerations for the design 
of hierarchical control in vertical relationships. The significant improvement in the F-test for the model and the 
likelihood ratio index confirms the value of incorporating process complexity into our analysis.
Model IV introduces IP requirements of the BPO relationship as a predictor of governance choice. The results 
confirm that hierarchical control in information intensive outsourcing relationships such as BPO is clearly a 
response to the IP requirements of the relationship. Model V finds that after controlling for the influence of all 
previously regressed variables, IP requirements is still a significant predictor of choice of hierarchical control, 
thereby, providing support for Hypothesis 1. A comparison of Models III and V indicates that the significance of 
sources of relational uncertainty and process complexity reduces on addition of IP requirements. The results of 
Models III-V in conjunction with that of Model I suggest that IP requirements of the relationship partially mediate 
the effect of relational uncertainty and process complexity on choice of hierarchical control.  
However, the above four step approach to analyzing mediation neither tests the significance of the indirect effect nor 
considers probable suppressed relationships. An alternative is to conduct the Sobel test (MacKinnon et al. 1995; 
Sobel 1982) to calculate the significance of the indirect effect of uncertainty. We calculate this indirect effect by 
multiplying the simple coefficient for a given dimension of uncertainty predicting IP requirements in Model I with 
that of the partial regression effect for IP requirements predicting governance choice in Model IV. 
Model I: εαααα ++++= UncerocessUncerlUncerEnvqIP _Pr_Re_Re_ 3210
Model IV: εβββββ +++++= qIPUncerocessUncerlUncerEnvGov Re__Pr_Re_ 43210
We find that the mediation model was supported for all sources of uncertainty (p<0.05) confirming the mediating 
effect of IP requirements of the BPO relationship on governance choice.
The results for the controls used in our analyses are largely consistent with prior research. Strategic importance of 
the outsourced process is a significant predictor of hierarchical control in almost all specifications. Strategic BPO 
relationships are characterized by high payoffs and thus, are frequently long-term, close and involve a sustained, 
focused and complex pattern of interaction between and within each of the participant firms (Ford 1990). These 
integrative patterns of cooperation and coordination embodied in a strategic BPO relationship necessitate greater 
hierarchical control. The significantly positive coefficient of firm size is consistent with research findings that larger 
firms often have “superior financial and human resource endowments” (Leiblein et al. 2002) required to invest in 
mechanisms of hierarchical control.
Moderating Effect of Technological Capabilities of the BPO Relationship
Model VI in Table 1 introduces technological capabilities of the BPO relationship as a predictor of governance 
choice, and Model VII introduces the interaction between IP requirements and technological capabilities as a 
predictor of governance choice while controlling for the individual effects of these variables. The significance of the 
interaction term provides initial evidence of the moderating effect of technological capabilities. However, given the 
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empirical need to control for self-selection of technological capabilities or firm- and transaction-level heterogeneity 
that impacts choice of technological capabilities and hierarchical control, we use a switching regression model to 
estimate the moderation effect. Table 2 presents the results of the first stage probit model of choice of technological 
capabilities. Given that the results in Table 2 are primarily used to formulate the inverse mills ratio, we do not 
discuss these results at length. We note that the instrumental variable used is a significant predictor of technological 
capabilities. Consistent with the IP view of the firm, we find that such capabilities are an important response to the 
IP requirements of the BPO relationship. Strategic importance of the outsourced process is significant, and is 
consistent with the notion that technology plays a pivotal role in managing the sets of information exchanged 
between a firm and its customers and maximizing information as the key strategic asset (Glazer 1999).
Table 2: First Stage Probit Estimates of Technological Capabilities of the BPO Relationship1, 2, 3
Variable Technological 
Capabilities
IP Requirements  0.389** 
(0.181)
Environmental Uncertainty  0.155
(0.174)
Uncertainty in the BPO Relationship
Relative Bargaining Power  0.209
(0.146)




Uncertainty in the Outsourced Business Process
Process Complexity  0.047
(0.185)




Strategic Importance  0.235*
(0.126)
Technological Resources of the Firm  0.407**
(0.178)
Model R2 / Likelihood Ratio Index  0.22
1. Positive coefficients indicate a greater probability of choice of high technological capabilities
2. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, *** p<0.01 in a two tailed test
3. Numbers below coefficients in parentheses are standard errors that are adjusted for correlations at the individual level and are robust to 
arbitrary heteroscedasticity.
Initial specifications of the second stage model of choice of hierarchical control across the sub-samples of 
technological capabilities focused on self-selection bias due to unobservable variables correlated with choice of both 
technological capabilities and hierarchical control. However, our analyses found no evidence of sample selection 
bias - the inverse mills ratio was insignificant in the governance choice regressions in both samples. We also found 
no evidence of multicollinearity between the inverse Mills ratio and the other explanatory variables in both samples 
that might inflate the standard errors of such estimates and consequently, understate the statistical significance of
selection bias in the regression of hierarchical control.
Table 3 provides results of the regressions of hierarchical control. We find that while controlling for technological 
capabilities, IP requirements are a positive and significant predictor when technological capabilities are high but 
insignificant when capabilities are low. This confirms the moderating effect of technological capabilities on the 
relationship between IP requirements and governance choice posited in Hypothesis 2a. Evidence of the 
complementary relation between technological capabilities and IP requirements rejects the substitutional effect of 
these variables on hierarchical control theorized in Hypothesis 2b. 
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Adjusted R-Square  0.40  0.29
N   80   51
1. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, *** p<0.01 in a two tailed test,
2.  Numbers below coefficients in parentheses are standard errors that are adjusted for correlations at the individual level and are robust to 
arbitrary heteroscedasticity.
CONCLUDING DISCUSSION
Over the past few years, outsourcing of value chain functions has gained significant momentum as organizations 
increasingly outsource broader business processes – particularly information intensive ones such as human 
resources, finance and accounting, supply chain management and customer care – to achieve diverse strategic 
objectives. The findings in this study shed light on how user firms in these BPO initiatives choose from among 
diverse governance structures to formalize their relationship with the service provider. The typology of governance 
structures used in this study is primarily defined by the level of hierarchical control embodied in the structure. In a 
shift from the traditional transaction cost framework of governance choice, we find that IP requirements of the BPO 
relationship is an important predictor of the level of hierarchical control employed with technological capabilities of 
the relationship moderating such impact of IP requirements. Further, we extend Galbraith’s original IP framework to 
the BPO context to find that uncertainty in the user firm’s business environment, outsourced business process and 
BPO relationship are important antecedents of IP requirements of the BPO relationship, emphasizing that IP 
requirements mediate the effects of these dimensions of uncertainty on governance choice. 
The results provide strong support for the influence of IP requirements on governance choice in the relationship. 
This result suggests that the governance structure is not just a contractual mechanism that addresses incentive 
conflict and considerations of hold-up, as posited in prior research, but also an important informational response to 
diverse contingencies that reduces the information states that decision makers have to contend with in the 
relationship. Our results emphasize that the central role of IP requirements in BPO relationships must be 
investigated more closely in future research. Given that an understanding of IP requirements is important for 
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efficient governance choices in BPO relationships, it may also well influence the fundamental choice of firm 
boundaries and could be examined in future research as an important basis for why firms exist. 
We theorize and find support for the simultaneous influence of sources of three important dimensions of uncertainty 
on IP requirements – the characteristics of the market environment within which the BPO relationship operates, the 
characteristics of the BPO relationship, and the characteristics of the outsourced process or function. These 
dimensions of uncertainty and their influences have been discussed in separate research streams. For example, TCE 
(Williamson 1991) focuses on the discriminating alignment between relational uncertainty and governance choice 
while IP theories (Galbraith 1973) emphasize that organizational structure must be responsive to uncertainty and 
contingencies in organizational tasks. An important contribution of this study is the development of a theoretical 
framework that captures the comparative and cumulative influence of these factors on the organization of vertical 
relationships. The synergistic impact of these dimensions of uncertainty on IP requirements emphasizes that their 
joint assessment is necessary in future research to enhance the explanatory power of extant theories of organization.
Our finding that technological capabilities of the BPO relationship moderate the impact of IP requirements on the 
level of hierarchical control in the relationship suggests that sophisticated technologies in information intensive 
outsourcing relationships are increasingly used to enhance interactions and coordination between the user firm and 
service provider rather than provide transaction processing capabilities. This is consistent with prior research 
(Mendelson and Pillai 1998; Zuboff 1998) which indicates that in fast-clockspeed environments, the emphasis of 
technology shifts from automating to informating or ensuring that the right information is available to the right 
decision maker at the right time. Our results for the predictors of hierarchical control across both high and low levels 
of technological capabilities after controlling for the influence of IP requirements also support this viewpoint. Given 
expansive and intensive use of sophisticated technologies in the outsourced task environment, hierarchical control is 
primarily a response to the need to coordinate process information across firm boundaries and manage the ensuing 
interdependencies between firms in this regard. On the other hand, given lower levels of technological capabilities, 
the results suggest that hierarchical control is primarily used for better control and monitoring of flows and 
processes between the firms to address appropriation concerns that stem from lack of mutual trust and strategic 
importance of the outsourced process. The relatively lower significance of bargaining power when technological 
capabilities are high is also consistent with the greater emphasis on coordination in this case.
This study is subject to limitations. One assumption of the IP theory is that interaction effects of IP requirements and 
capabilities dominate the main effects of these variables (Drazin and Van de Ven 1985). Thus, capabilities choice is 
not a constant, but needs to change. Likewise, IP requirements of the user firm and its antecedents may also change 
during learning processes in a continuous feedback system where requirements and capabilities adapt to each other 
(Sobrero and Schrader 1998). Thus, it is important to recognize that as the goals and expectations of the user firm 
and service provider evolve over time, the IP requirements of the BPO relationship and its antecedents also evolve. 
In the current study, we have only cross-sectional data, which limits our ability to provide a richer conceptualization 
of the theoretical relationships. A multi-period model will address this issue and introduce a dynamic perspective 
that has been neglected by structural contingency frameworks.
The next limitation also presents an important avenue for further research. Although this study presents the view that 
effective information processing is a strategic goal of governance choices in information intensive outsourcing 
relationships, we do not examine the impact of such informational-focus governance choices on exchange 
performance. Future research could relate the alignment between the IP requirements and governance choice to 
exchange performance and ultimately to financial value and firm competitiveness. 
Despite these limitations, we believe that this study makes important contributions to the literature on organization 
of outsourcing relationships. Comprehensive data on transaction and relational characteristics of a range of BPO 
relationships allows us to take the first step towards explaining the variety of relational structures that user firms and 
service providers build together to organize the outsourced activity. In doing so, we complement and extend the rich 
literature on firm boundaries. Our results emphasize that moving forward, as business processes become 
increasingly information intensive and their externalization matures to being a collaborative process that is 
increasingly strategic in its impact, the organization of these processes is largely motivated by concerns of 
information processing that stem from traditional considerations of hold-up as well as issues of work design and task 
coordination. This is consistent with our belief that hierarchical control in the outsourcing governance structure, in 
addition to attention to controlling opportunism, enables participant firms to define and coordinate process tasks and 
responsibilities so as to meet outsourcing objectives and create strategic value.  
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